How to protect location privacy of mobile users is an important issue in ubiquitous wmputing. However, location privacy protection is particularly challenging: on one hand, the administration requires all legitimate users to provide identity information in order to grant them permission to use its wireless service; on the other hand, mobile users would prefer not to expose any information that could enable anyone, including the administration, to get some clue regarding their whereabouts; mobile users would like to have complete personal control of their location privacy. To address this issue, we propose an authorized-anonymous-ID-based scheme; this scheme effectively eliminates the need for a trusted semer or administration, which is assumed in the previous work. Our key weapon is a cryptographic technique called blind signature, which is used to generate an authorized anonymous ID that replaces the real ID of an authorized mobile device. With authorized anonymous IDS, we design an architecture capable of achieving complete personal control over location privacy while maintaining the authentication function required hy the administration.
INTRODUCTION
The convergence of wireless communication infrastructure, mobile computing devices, and embedded systems has been causing a profound shift in the way we live and work, offering the promise of bringing us closc to the holy grail of information technology: ubiquitous computing -computing at any place and any time [l] . To fulfill the promise of ubiquitous computing, information about mobile users' locations is a critical and valuable resource that needs to he utilized. Many efforts have been made to make it available as o n e of the key services in the ubiquitous computing environment. However, the location information service or functionality can act as a double-edged sword: it can make our life more convenient, but it could also provide criminals with powerful weapons to compromise the privacy of mobile users. Computer scientists have realized that unless the use of this information is strictly controlled, it can be put to a variety of unsavoly uses [l, 21 .
To address'the location privacy issue, an architecture for location privacy control [Z] was designed and experimented on the WirelessAndrew network, an IEEE 802.11 wireless local area network (WLAN) that covers the entire campus of Carnegie Mellon University. The architccture implemented in [Z] is illustrated in Fig. 1 . Under the architecture, there is a centralized location server where a mobile user can register and submit her location information along with herpermission rule set regarding her privacy preferences. Others can send queries to the sewer for location information about mobile users whose location information is stored in the semer. The semer processes the query according to the queried user's preference specified within the set of rules, and then the scrver may return the queried information, deny the query, o r return a fake location as described in [Z] .
This architecture was primitivc in the initial phasc of the experimental system because it focused on strategic treatments of mobile location privacy rather than system construction. This simple architecture is essentially identical to the one described in [I] . In [l] it was suggested that a distributed architecture could assist the control of mobile location privacy, since a centralized architecture has the following drawbacks: * The location privacy of mobile users is not completely under their own control since. the system administration maintains a central server where the location information of mobile users is stored. 9 The central server is a single failure point; that is, the location privacy of mobile users would be compromised if an attacker successfully hacked into it. * A centralized architecture is not scalable.
However, to achieve complete personal control on location.privacy by replacing a centralized architecture with a distributed one is not trivial, For instance, the system administration, for the sake of system maintenance and management, has privilege to check any access point, and obtain a list of 1P addresses and corresponding medium access control (MAC) addresses of the mobile devices connecting to the checked access point. The administration also has data' that can indicate a bijection relationship between MAC addresses (or IP addresses) of authorized mobile devices and registered legitimate mobile users. The location information about a mobile user can easily be figured out by the administration. Then we face such a dilemma: on one hand, the administration would like to require all legitimate users to provide information for authentication in order to grant them permission to use their wireless service; on the other hand, the mobile uscrs would prefer not to expose any of their information (e.g., IDS and MAC addresses) that would enable anyone, including the administration, to get clues as to their whereabouts.
To resolve the above dilemma, this article proposes an authorized-anonymous-ID-based scheme. In our scheme, an authorized anonymous ID generated hy a cryptographic technique called blind signature 131 , is used to replace the real ID (e.g., a MAC.address) of an authorized mobile device (e.g., a WaveLAN card). An anonymous ID can tell nothing more than whether the provider of the ID is an authorized user. This authorized anonymous ID is then used as the key for packet authentication, and the message authentication code [4] (generated by the key) is used for access control. In this way, the administration can grant authorized mobile users access to the wireless communication infrastructure, while mobile users need not divulge their real ID during authorization, which could otherwise lead to compromising their location privacy.
Built on an agent-based architecture,* our authorized-anonymous-ID-based scheme enables mobile users to have complete control of their location privacy.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. The following section describes our system architecture for personal control of mobile location privacy. We then present a set of protocols for the authorized-anonymous-ID-based scheme that enables location privacy protection. Next, the article discusses related work. In the final section we conclude the article.
SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
To address location privacy in a ubiquitous computing environment, we need to understand the key components of ubiquitous computing. Based on this understanding, we can then design a system to protect location privacy. Here, we first sketch key components in ubiquitous computing from a security perspective, and then present our agent-based system architecture for location privacy protection.
A SKETCH OF UBIQUITOUS COMPUTING
For quite some time, a ubiquitous computing environment has been depicted as dynamically changing self-organized networks, formed by learn that a ubiquitous computing environment should he formed by a powerful infrastructure that is highly available, cost effective, and sufficiently scalable to support millions of users, and low-power mobile devices that are small and lightweight; it does not matter very much what a device can do; what matters is the possibility that the device can harness terabytes of data and the power of supercompute r s even while mobile, as long as i t has a n access to a ubiquitous network [5] . This nnderstanding of the formation of ubiquitous computing will guide the design of o u r system architecture for location privacy protection.
On the o t h e r hand, security, already a thorny problem in the Internet, is greatly complicated by ubiquitous computing, not only because of its security vulnerability due to the sharing nature of the wireless medium, and computational limitation resulting.from requirements of low weight, compact size, and good ergonomics of mobile devices and embedded systems; but, more important, because of the following challenges: * Geographically distributed systems are connected to form heterogeneous networks of unlimited scale; so there can be no central authority, no homogeneous security policy, and no ubiquitous security infrastructure for security enforcement or guarantee. The design of security mechanisms for ubiquitous computing needs to follow the endto-end principle [6].
T h e agent technology (71 can effectively address the aforementioned challcnges for three reasons. First, agents are autonomous and distributed; so no central authority is needed for security enforcement. Second, agents can act on users' behalf; hence, agent-based security mechanisms can be designed as user-centered. Third, agents are application-oriented, which naturally satisfies the end-to-end principle (i.e., agents communicate on the application layer).
Based on the agent concept, we perceive, from a security perspective, that a ubiquitous computing environment should consist of the following three key components ( An engineering practice that addresses the second case is described in 191; there, a deviceto-proxy protocol and a proxy-to-proxy protocol were designed and implemented.
Internet -provides a communication channel between a PTCB and a PAN; however, the channel cannot be trusted.
An agent runs on the main home PC.
AGENT-BASED SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
Since the properties of agents meet the security requirements imposed by ubiquitous computing, we design an agent-based system architccture for location privacy protection. We first introduce the following agents that act on behalf of the players (devices or users) under our architecture.
Administrator (A): an agent that acts on behalf of an administration to authenticate legitimate users and grant them an access to the wireless infrastructure. Rover (R): an agent running at a PTCB that acts on behalf of the owner of a mobile device.
It is responsible for working out the location of the mobile device, automatically updating the location information stored in the home PC (managed by another agent called manager, described below), and interacting with the users for privacy permission setting [Z].
Manager (M): a n agent running at a home PC that can be delegated to act on behalf of a mobile user. It manages the location information submitted by R and executes the user's control policy [Z] for location privacy when it processes location information queries from other users.
Connector (C): an agent running at an access point delegated by A to authenticate mobile devices and control wireless connections between mobile devices and the access point.
Lookup service (L): an optional agent that provides Internet users with public lookup service. Lookvp agents acting as well-known public service providers will listen for location informa-
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tion queries from users and fonvard the queries to the queried users' M running at their home.
With the above agents, we propose a multiagent system architecture as illustrated in Fig. 3 .
Under the architecture, agents communicate with each other through three types of protocols: the registration protocol, the controlled counection protocol, and the location querylresponse protocol, numbered I , 2, and 3, respectively in Fig. 3 . In the next section we present the registration protocol and the controlled connection protocol; a description of the location querylresponse protocol can he found in [Z].
AN AUTHORIZED-ANONYMOUS-ID-
BASED SCHEME This section presents our authorized-anonymous-ID-based scheme, specifically, the registration and controlled connection protocols.
T o authenticate users when they request t o access the wireless infrastructure, we first need t o assign a valid ID t o a legitimate user (i;e,, authorize a user), and then only the authorized users are allowed to access the network infrastructure (i.e., access control). Hence, there are two phases in our scheme: * The registration phase specified by a regis-' tration protocol -The controlled connection phase specified T h e registration phase is t o authorize users, while the controlled connection phase is to control access. In the first phase, the M (or R) of a mobilc user applies for an authorized anonymous ID from the administrator of the wireless infrastructure. After the first phase, the obtained authorized anonymous ID is carried by the R of the mobile user and will be presented when the mobile device requests connection through an access point. In the second phase, the R presents the ID to request connection; the ID is also used by the access point to authenticate the packets from the mobile device thereafter for the purpose of access control. Table 1 lists the notations used in the description of the protocols. Note that since both R, a n d Mu have the private key o f U , both can "speak for" U. If R, and Mu are interchangeable in the protocol, we use U to represent them. In other words, U in the following protocols can be replaced by either R, or Mu.
by a controlled connection protocol REGISTRATION PROTOCOL In our registration protocol, initial authcntication of users is required. We assume that there is an infrastructure supporting the initial authentication of users. This infrastructure could be either a public key infrastructure (PKI) or a Kerberos-based system [lo] . If a PKI is in place, to obtain authentication a user must sign its request using its digital signature, and send the request to the administrator.
Our registration protocol is based on authorized anonymous IDS. With an authorized anonymous ID as a digital token, a legitimate mohile device can be granted permission t o access the wireless infrastructure after a successful authentication; but the association between private key is held by her rover running in her PTCB and manager in A mobile user, identified by her public key. the token and the real ID of a lcgitimate uscr is eliminated. The registration protocol is outlined in Fig. 4 . As mentioned previously, the role of U in the registration protocol could be played by either R, or Mu, depending on the environment where the U is currently staying. Usually, when a U is at home with her mobile device, she can have the Mu initiate the protocol to get the authorized anonymous ID (rr. D A ( H ( r , ) ) ) , and then convey the authorized anonymous ID to the R, via a secure channel between the R, and the Mu, which is protected by a symmetric cryptosystem, as mentioned previously. If the mobile device already has a connection to the administrator, the R can also initiate the registration procedure to get an ID in order t o make the mobile user "disappcar" with the new ID (refer to reconfusing protocol below). Whoever initiates the protocol, the ID must be passed to the R in order for the mobile device to get authenticated at access points.
THE CONTROLLED CONNECTION PROTOCOL
Once an R obtains an ID, the mobile device can use the controlled connection protocol to get access to the wireless infrastructure via an access point. The procedure is the following. First, the. R sends an access request by presenting its authorized anonymous ID (encrypted with the administrator's public key) to the C at the access point. Then the C fowdrds the message to its A for verification. The A decrypts the message, verifies the authenticity of the embedded authorized anonymous ID, signs the ID (if it is a valid one), encrypts the ID and thc signature with the key shared by the C, and sends the encrypted message hack to the C. Once Figure 4 . Registration profocol encrypted message from the A, it decrypts it and checks the signature signed by the A and sends an acknowledgment (ack) to the R if the signature is valid. Thereafter, the R and C share the I D as a secret for packet authentication, and only successfully authenticated packets can get through the access point t o the Internet. This protocol is outlined in Fig. 5 .
IMPROVEMENTS
T h e basic protocols presented above can h e improved by the following methods.
Reconfusion -I t is known that the longer an I D exists, the higher the chances of exposing the association between the ID and the corresponding mobile user. To mitigate this problem, we propose a method called reconfusion, the objective of which is to generate a new authorized anonymous I D t o replace the old authorized anonymous ID. Figure 6 outlines our protocol for the reconfusion method. Specifically, the process of reconfusion works as follows. First, an R sends the administrator a request (encrypted with the public key of t h e administrator) for a new authorized anonymous ID. Different from the registration protocol, in which a real identification (e.g., a public key certificate) is required to be presented, a request for a new authorized anonymous ID in reconfusion contains:
-One of the mobile user's current or previous authorized anonymous IDS * A random number multiplied by a factor that is blind or unknown to the administrator * A symmetric encryption key suggested for this communication session between the R and the A After successful verification of the presented ID, the A signs the blind signature on the random number, encrypts it with the suggested key, and sends it back to the requesting R. The R decrypts the message from the A, removes the blind factor, and gets the new authorized anonymous ID. The nice feature of our reconfusion protocol is that any disclosure of the previous ID would not compromise the anonymity of the new ID.
Access Authorization Revocation -It is not desirable from the administration perspective for an authorized anonymous ID to enablc a mobile dcvice t o have a n eternal right-to access t h e infrastructure. Hence, an administration may want to have a function that can revoke or invalidate an issued authorized anonymous ID. One way to add this revocation function to our protocol family is that the A periodically expires and changes its own keys for access authorization. [14] . In these schemes, personal mobile location privacy control relies on either home administration, foreign administration, or both. Moreover, it is required for home administration to share some secrets with foreign administration in order to prevent eavesdroppers from having any knowledge about binding users' temporal identificrs and real identifiers. These efforts cannot make mobile Iocation privacy completely controlled by a mobile user since the administration can associate any identifier (PI1 or TMI) with its corresponding real ID of the mobile user (or device).
Under our scheme, the dilemma arising from two seemingly conflicting expectations, security (or connection access control) and privacy (or location information confidentiality), is resolved by using an authorized anonymous ID created with a cryptographic technique: blind signature. The authorized anonymous IDS are used by mobile users as permission tokens for connection access controlled by the administration. A t the same time, the authorized anonymous IDS, embedded in the packets transmitted to ~C C C S S points would not reveal any information about the mobile users since the IDS being used are completely disassociated from the real 1Ds of the users.
Since wc have noticed that efforts such as [13, 141 havc been made to address the location privacy issue at a lower layer (e.g., IP layer) rather than at the application layer, it may be worth mentioning that according to our rationale study, a m a t h i n e e q u i p p e d w i t h a l o w e r l a y e r technique may n o t he able to effectively achieve personal control over the location privacy, because a n y h o w the lower layer technique will depend on the operators of the infrastructures t o h i d e t h e i d e n t i t y of a mobile user. Also, in contrast t o our s o l u t i o n a t t h e application layer, t h e solutions at the IP layer are even harder to deploy. A detailed justification can he found in the Personal U b i q u i t o u s M u l t i -A g e n t (PUMA) project report [15].
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this article we investigate the problem of prot e c t i n g l o c a t i o n p r i v a c y of m o b i l e users in t h e s e t t i n g of ubiquitous computing. We p o i n t out that l o c a t i o n privacy protection i s particularly c h a l l e n g i n g d u e to t h e d i f f e r e n t r e q u i r e m e n t s imposed by the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n a n d mobile users.
To address this issue, we propose an authorizedanonymous-ID-based scheme. In our scheme, an authorized anonymous ID i s created by the blind s i g n a t u r e technique and i s used to r e p l a c e t h e real ID of an authorized m o b i l e device. With authorized anonymous IDS, w e have designed an architecture t h a t i s able to provide mobile users w i t h complete control over their location privacy w h i l e a l l o w i n g the administration t o authenticate legitimate mobile users.
Our future work will focus on t h e o r e t i c a l analysis of the security of this set of protocols. In addition, the system has b e e n built on the Wireless-Andrew network, a WLAN covering the c a m p u s of C a r n e g i e Mellon U n i v e r s i t y , a n d w e plan to generalize the p r o t o c o l s for h e t e r o g eneous n e t w o r k i n g environments (e.g., a hybrid WLAN, PAN, a n d WAN) to accommodate various networking technologies.
